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While debates over the role of natural resources in develop-
ment typically focus on the national scale, tracing links
between mineral dependence, the quality of national institu-
tions, and aggregate indicators of growth, poverty, conﬂict,
and democracy (Auty, 1993; Collier & Hoeﬄer, 2005; Karl,
2009; Sachs & Warner, 2001), recent literature suggests the
existence of a speciﬁc form of the resource curse that exists
at the subnational level (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011, 2012). At
the core of this curse are the distortionary eﬀects that large
royalty and ﬁscal transfers to local authorities can have on
local economy and politics. The argument that ﬁscal transfers
are damaging may appear counter-intuitive, given that local
social movements frequently call for a greater share of the
ﬁnancial resources generated by extractive industries. How-
ever, Arellano-Yanguas (2011, 2012) has demonstrated that
subnational authorities are frequently unable to invest these
transfers in sustainable forms of growth and poverty reduction
and that such transfers induce rent seeking among politicians
and catalyze a range of socio-political conﬂicts as diﬀerent
groups contest access to and control over these resources or
simply express vocal dismay at their ineﬀective use. These dis-
tortions lead to disappointing indicators of growth and pov-
erty reduction in those regions where extractive industries
are located (see also Ponce & McClintock, 2014).
The identiﬁcation of these sub-national eﬀects as a new form
of resource curse is a vital contribution to the literature. Yet,
we would also note that the phenomenon is not purely local,
nor modern, nor curse. First, the production of (or escape
from) the local resource curse is a scaled process involving
interactions among sub-national, national, and supranational
factors. Second, actors’ responses to the availability of
rents are very probably rooted in long-standing, historical
ideas and projects. Third, the emergence of extractive
industries transforms the social, political, and economic life
of territories in complex and multiple ways that can remain105unrecognized if the analytical focus is only on whether a
“curse” exists or not.
This paper seeks to capture some of the complexity that is at
playwhen an extractive economy becomes consolidated in a ter-
ritory. We do not argue against the existence of a local resource
curse—indeed in some ways the territory we discuss might be
said to have suﬀered a mild case of the resource curse, insofar
as it has prospered far less than one might have expected given
the scale of resource extraction that it has experienced (just as
Ross, 2013, has identiﬁed curse like eﬀects at a national scale
in those countries that have performed less well than they
“should” have given their large resource endowment). Nor is
our purpose to argue against generic accounts and to claim that
every case is complex and diﬀerent. Instead we are interested in
giving a fuller account of how extractive industries transform
territories, and to identify themes that may not be adequately
captured by the typical lists of factors that resource curse studies
identify: e.g., “government capacity,” “corruption,” “rent-seek-
ing,” “distrust,” “violence”, etc. We approach this complexity
with three hypotheses in mind. First, the local eﬀects of extrac-
tion depend considerably on the pre-existing structure of the
rural and regional economy. Second, “imaginaries” and ideas
regarding appropriate strategies for territorial development
and the futures to which residents of these territories might
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tion, evenwhen the rise of resource extraction also changes these
imaginaries (Rodrı´guez-Carmona, Castro, & Sanchez, 2013).
Third, these diverse imaginaries reﬂect the prior existence of dis-
tinct territorializing projects (c.f. Wilson, 2004) that intersect in
diﬀerent ways with the expansion of extractive industries, doing
much to determine their ﬁnal eﬀects on local development.
These projects foster, resist,mold and/or take advantage of such
extractive investments in pursuit of a certain vision of territory.
They are constituted by views on how space should be demar-
cated, governed, and used, by whom and to what ends, and
embrace issues of identity and rules for relations with other ter-
ritories and with other scales of government (Delaney, 2009).
These projects are carried forward by actors—and more gener-
ally social coalitions of distinct actors—each pursuing the polit-
ical and institutional changes required in order to render their
projects viable (Berdegue´, Bebbington, & Escobal, 2015;
Coleman, 1970; Cox & Mair, 1991).
These struggles to deﬁne the institutions governing territo-
rial dynamics frequently exceed the boundaries of the territory
in question (Allen, 2011) insofar as actors and social coalitions
pursuing distinct territorial projects operate through networks
that connect them to other actors operating at multiple scales.
In this sense, territorial projects are rarely if ever pursued at a
single scale, and instead involve eﬀorts to change scalar rela-
tionships. Often, and certainly in the case of mining and
hydrocarbons, these scalar relations are not independent of
the natural resources being mobilized or contested as part of
a territorial project.
Likewise these projects exceed the boundaries of “the pres-
ent.” They have long histories and are aﬀected by memories
and pre-extraction patterns of economic organization. Indeed,
the social coalitions associated with a particular vision of ter-
ritory can change over time, just as the territorial imaginations
of particular actors can also change. The point is that coali-
tions respond to the arrival of extractive industry through
the lenses of these pre-existing projects in ways that aﬀect
the impact of extraction on patterns of growth and poverty
reduction within a territory.
Framed by these concepts of territorial projects, social coali-
tions, and changing scalar relationships, this paper analyzes
the rural territorial dynamics that have been catalyzed by a
rapid expansion in the extraction of natural gas in the Depart-
ment of Tarija, Bolivia. Through an analysis of recent eco-
nomic, political, and territorial transformations at both
regional and municipal scales, the paper argues that the rise
of natural gas extraction has: (i) changed the scale relation-
ships that are inherent in pre-existing territorial projects; (ii)
itself been aﬀected by these projects; and (iii) transformed ter-
ritories in ways determined by the nature of, and the aspira-
tions underlying, a range of prior territorial projects. While
the paper is not an assessment of whether Tarija is or is not
suﬀering the local resource curse, we do argue that though
development indicators have evolved positively, they have
not departed signiﬁcantly from national trends, and that this
relatively muted impact to date has much to do with the three
dimensions of transformation noted in the preceding sentence.2. RURAL TERRITORIAL DYNAMICS IN
MULTI-SCALE TERRITORIAL PROJECTS
(a) Rural territorial dynamics and large-scale resource
extraction
Our study is located conceptually in the debate on rural ter-
ritorial development in Latin America (Boisier, 2005; FAO,2012; Schejtman & Berdegue´, 2004). These approaches empha-
size the interactions between economic, political, and institu-
tional factors in deﬁning patterns of resource access and
productivity, and the implications for territorially diﬀerenti-
ated development outcomes. In a context in which a number
of governments in Latin America have been promoting the
extraction of minerals and hydrocarbons as an accelerated
means of overcoming constraints on ﬁscal resources and
domestic savings and to foster growth and tackle high poverty
levels (Bebbington & Bury, 2013; Kaup, 2013), these debates
on rural territorial dynamics necessarily have to engage with
debates on resource extraction and power relations
(Bjorvatn, Farzanegan, & Schneider, 2012).
Extractive industry-based development strategies of the
sorts promoted by governments in Latin America imply a
dominant role for large-scale investments in determining the
organization and use of rural space. 1 Such investments inevi-
tably originate from beyond the territories in which resources
are located, and frequently from beyond the countries. Fur-
thermore these resources circulate as commodities in national
and international markets. Consequently, the dynamics of
such rural territories are aﬀected by scale relations in which
these rural territories become important nodes in supra-terri-
torial economic and political networks (Bridge, 2008). Some
authors (e.g., Boisier, 2005) have made the more general argu-
ment that embedding territories in processes operating at mul-
tiple scales can create space for local development within
globalization processes, but that for this to occur requires
the explicit socio-political construction of territorial projects
that deliberately seek such local room for manoeuver. For
the speciﬁc case of extractive industries, one question, then,
is what sorts of territorial project might create conditions that
facilitate local development in the presence of large-scale min-
ing and hydrocarbon investments. As the “local resource-
curse” literature suggests, these conditions are not obvious,
and frequently local governments and community organiza-
tions are unable to make eﬀective use of the signiﬁcant
increase in local ﬁnancial resources produced by resource
extraction, and also lack the political weight to establish more
or less symmetric relationships with international companies
and national governments (c.f. Arellano-Yanguas, 2011;
Bebbington, Hinojosa, Bebbington, Burneo, & Warnaars,
2008; Hinojosa, 2012). Furthermore, as the case in this paper
shows, spatial convergence need not only policies that aﬀect
the average income of local populations, but explicit policies
that address intra-regional and intra-locality structural
inequalities (see also Modrego & Berdegue´, 2015).(b) Territorial projects
The concept of territorial projects draws attention to the
ways in which actors and coalitions negotiate and construct
visions of what territories should become, how and by whom
they should be governed, the economic activities, patterns of
resource access, and public investments on which they should
be based, and the ways in which resources and revenues should
be controlled (see also Berdegue´ et al., 2015). In this sense, this
concept recalls that of territoriality (Delaney, 2009) which
invokes the imaginaries, discourses, and practices that attempt
to make one development strategy prevalent over others.
Wilson (2004) relates the concept to the ways in which the
state seeks to structure and control space through mechanisms
such as public investments in infrastructure. For others,
territorial projects or territorialities can hinge around the
“re-spacing” of rural development (Marsden, 2004) or the
emergence of new forms of governance based on the rescaling
GAS AND DEVELOPMENT: RURAL TERRITORIAL DYNAMICS IN TARIJA, BOLIVIA 107of statehood in which the primacy of the national scale of
political-economic life is decentered and other levels of gov-
ernment become more signiﬁcant (Brenner, 2004). Rather than
implying a “hollowing out, erosion, withering, or demise” of
the state, such a rescaling involves a “transformed form of
statehood” (Brenner, 2004, 34). In these processes of rescaling,
multiple territorial projects, fostered and undertaken by diﬀer-
ent levels of government, might converge on the same space in
ways that exist in synergy or in tension with each other.
Territorial projects do not, though, emanate only from
states. Indeed, state-led processes of rescaling, and the territo-
rial projects and social coalitions that underlie them,
frequently encounter attempts by other groups (peasantries,
indigenous peoples, landless laborers, small-scale entrepre-
neurs, regional elites, etc.) with distinct notions of territory
and projects of resource governance (Bebbington & Bury,
2013; Escobar, 2008; Wilson, 2004). These subaltern or subna-
tional actors often harness powers and instrumentalities at
other scales (Slater, 1998), building alliances and coalitions
to counter or re-negotiate state-led projects of re-scaling.
These diﬀerent territorial projects frequently reﬂect longer
standing aspirations for resource use and control, and ideas
of how territories should relate to other spaces and scales.
(c) Social coalitions and institutional change
Coalitions are often understood as groups of actors who
coordinate how to deploy their resources jointly through pro-
cesses of collective decision-making (Coleman, 1970). Coali-
tions might be understood as mobilizing both social and
political capital (Fuchs, Minnite, & Shapiro, 1999) as they
pursue their territorial projects: social capital residing in the
exclusive networks that actors can mobilize in order to access
resources, and political capital residing in the ability of some
groups, through the accumulation of social capital, to inﬂu-
ence broader decision-making processes. Such social and polit-
ical capitals are not, however, suﬃcient for crafting viable
territorial projects. The literature on resource-based develop-
ment suggests the link between mineral wealth and sub-
national development also depends on the power balance
within the country (Bjorvatn et al., 2012) and a set of institu-
tional and social arrangements (c.f. Dietsche, 2008; Rosser,
2006) that formally “devolve” authority at the same time as
promoting investment in the territory, allowing mediation
among conﬂicting territorial projects in ways that arrive at
some degree of consensus. This institutional change can also
lead to new forms of democracy that lead to the emergence
of policy networks that are more eﬀective in managing a
resource-dependent economy (Orihuela, 2013) and to the for-
mulation and implementation of economic policies for local
territorial development (for example, through the mechanisms
of neocorporatist democracy fostered by the Ecuadorian
indigenous movements analyzed by Ospina Peralta,
Santillana Ortiz, and Arboleda (2008). The emergence of such
territorialized institutions is not straightforward, especially in
contexts where national governments might also seek to
strengthen their control over the resources generated by
resource extraction with a view to using them for national
social and political projects. National government might also
have an interest in reducing the scope for consensus building
among territorial actors (and thus weakening the emergence
of co-ordinated territorial projects that conﬂict with the gov-
ernment’s) or might unwittingly aggravate territorial disputes
through other interventions. Indeed, some have argued that
certain interventions of the current Bolivian government have
weakened regional institutions and so created scope forconﬂict (see Gustafson & Fabricant, 2011 and Farthing &
Kohl, 2014 for discussions that throw light on such claims).
(d) Scalar relationships
Given the distinct territorial projects that diﬀerent parts of
state and society pursue through resource-based development
strategies, it is probable that expanded investment in mineral
extraction will lead to increased segmentation of the regional
economic structure, new forms of social diﬀerentiation and
conﬂict, and the emergence of new and potentially fragmented
territorial identities. Such processes of diﬀerentiation and seg-
mentation can elicit the emergence of new economic elites (de
Janvry & Sadoulet, 2004) and integrate rural areas into
national and supranational economies in new and diverse
ways, as well as create conditions for the emergence of new
forms of mobilization led by local actors seeking to use exer-
cise voice through existing institutions. Examples of such pro-
cesses have been described, for example, by Jaskoski (2014)
who notes cases of eﬀective local participation in the environ-
mental impact assessment of mining projects in Peru, and by
Yanez-Pagans and Machicado-Salas (2014) who note the
emergence of local monitoring capacity. Prior and emerging
regional economic structures thus inﬂuence how local territo-
ries are related to other scales, the actors and coalitions that
emerge to build or resist these relationships, and the ideas
underlying diﬀerent territorial projects (Neumann, 2009;
Taravella & Arnauld de Sartre, 2012). In Bolivia scale rela-
tionships constructed and mobilized during hydrocarbon
struggles involved the production of imaginative geographies
of the country and its hydrocarbon resources (Perreault and
Valdivia (2010), which in turn draw on historical memories
of nationhood and struggles over the meanings of develop-
ment, citizenship, and the country itself (Perreault, 2013).3. TERRITORIAL PROJECTS, RURAL DYNAMICS,
AND GAS EXTRACTION IN TARIJA, BOLIVIA
The case of Bolivia, until recently the second most impor-
tant country in terms of natural gas reserves in Latin America
after Venezuela (though since 2013 it has moved into ﬁfth
place as a result of new exploration activity in Argentina,
Brazil, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago: BP, 2014), illustrates
how the territorial projects of diﬀerent coalitions interact with
large-scale extractive activity, how these projects begin to
incorporate new relationships of scale as a response to the
presence of natural gas, and how these projects go on to aﬀect
territorial dynamics. We address these themes for the case of
the Department of Tarija, in Bolivia, with a particular focus
on Villamontes and Entre Rios, two municipalities in its east-
ern lowland “Chaco” region, where gas deposits are located
(see Fig. 1). Following a brief presentation of the methodology
underlying this research we discuss how gas production has
become part of longer standing as well as future-oriented ter-
ritorial imaginaries of diﬀerent types of actors in the region,
how coalitions of these actors have crafted new projects of ter-
ritorial intervention on the basis of these imaginaries, and the
extent to which these processes have led to material changes in
the outcomes and nature of territorial development in the
region as well as in the social and political relationships that
underlie this development. We then explore the social coali-
tions involved in diﬀerent territorial projects. While we draw
indicative conclusions regarding the local resource curse in
Tarija, our primary concern is to show the complex ways in
which gas has transformed these territories, how the rents it
Fig. 1. Study area.
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ritorial projects in the region, and how the economy of gas and
the central government’s gas-related interests have frustrated
the emergence of Tarija-wide coalitions and more coordinated
territorial projects.
(a) Methodology
This study was conducted as part of a continent-wide pro-
ject on the drivers of rural territorial dynamics in Latin Amer-
ica. That project sought to identify: (i) how Latin America’s
territories were performing in terms of growth, poverty,
inequality, and environmental quality: and then—for those
territories that had experienced improvements in income, pov-
erty, and inequality—(ii) the factors that explained such “suc-
cessful” performance. A prior welfare mapping exercise in
Bolivia (Hinojosa, Chumacero, & Chumacero, 2009;
Modrego & Berdegue´, 2015) identiﬁed areas that had shown
such improvements over an inter-census period (see Table 1).
Several of these territories were in Tarija. The department
was purposively selected for in-depth qualitative study on
the grounds that it had also experienced rapid and signiﬁcant
growth in natural gas extraction since the early 2000s, meaning
that the case would allow the overall project to consider how
extractive industries interact with territorial dynamics, and
how far gas extraction might be a driver of a territory’s
improvements in income, poverty, and inequality. Two munic-
ipalities, Villamontes and Entre Rios, were selected for more
in depth case study research. The municipalities were selectedTable 1. Change in demographic and social in
Population growth rate
Diﬀerence of literacy rates (15+ years old)
Diﬀerence of school attendance rates (6–19 years old)
Dwellings growth rate
Diﬀerence of percentages of dwellings with water provision from a public n
Diﬀerence of percentages of dwellings with electricity
Diﬀerence of percentages of dwellings with sanitation
Growth rate of dwellings with provision of some kind of cooking fuel
Growth rate of dwellings with provision of cooking natural fuels
Growth rate of dwellings with provision of cooking industrial fuels
Growth rate of pregnant women who attended a health center for delivery
Infant mortality rate (average 2005–10) (a)
Diﬀerence of poverty rates (2001 and 2011) (b)
n.d. is no data. 2001 and 2012: based on Census of Population and Dwellingson the basis of their important gas deposits, as well as our
prior research experience (Humphreys Bebbington, 2010,
2012; Humphreys Bebbington & Bebbington, 2010) and the
longstanding institutional presence of the Center for the
Regional Development of Tarija (CERDET) in each of them
(CERDET, 2006). Fieldwork, carried out during 2009–10,
included 130 semi-structured interviews with representatives
of public and private sectors and community organizations,
open-ended interviews with key informants from government,
gas companies and coalitions, and participant observation of
public fora. After an initial analysis of ﬁndings, validation
workshops were held with representatives of diﬀerent groups
in Tarija, Entre Rios, and Villamontes. A further component
of the research, not reported on here, modeled observable
environmental change through satellite imagery (Hinojosa &
Hennermann, 2012).
(b) Gas and the production of territorial projects in Tarija
Historically, the formation of territory in Tarija has reﬂected
the combined tension and convergence inhering in eﬀorts to com-
bine multiple territorial identities into a shared “regional project”
deﬁned in contradistinction to some sort of “central” authority.
Some projects are organized around a notion of “Tarija” deﬁned
in opposition to the country, while others revolve around a
notion of “the Chaco” deﬁned in opposition to the city of Tarija,
and yet others around a notion of one part of the Chaco as dis-
tinguished from other parts (Liza´rraga Aranı´bar & Vacaﬂores
Rivero, 2007, 25).dicators in the 2001–12 intercensus period
Bolivia Tarija Villamontes Entre Rios
1.7 1.9 1.1 1.0
8.3 8.5 5.1 12.2
3.8 6.1 8.8 5.9
39.1 47.7 115.0 41.6
etwork 3.8 6.0 2.1 3.0
13.8 17.8 9.9 16.0
6.2 1.1 1.2 13.3
41.8 44.9 100.6 39.0
5.5 5.9 3.1 4.3
73.1 74.2 197.9 361.1
54.9 62.3 108.6 126.8
45.6 37.2 34.1 44.5
7.9 5.2 n.d. n.d
of Bolivia, and Hinojosa (2013) for (a) and (b).
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ciate that Tarija has never been in the loop of national public invest-
ment because of the centralism that has characterized how resources
are used . . .. Peripheral regions are absent from national policies and
investment . . .. [The regional project for Tarija] was embodied in the
program that Cossio [Tarija’s then governor] presented in 2005 . . . a
project that had a very clear identity that contrasted with the identity
of the national government.. . . When we speak of territory, territory is
expressed spatially.. . . The towns of Yacuiba and Villamontes identify
Tarija as a city, not a department—they identify the city and its cen-
tralism as the source of all their ills. To counteract this, Villamontes
has developed its own urban infrastructure as a counterweight to Tari-
ja” (Project Director, Regional Government of Tarija, August, 2010).
“There’s a big diﬀerence between Entre Rios and Villamontes. Entre
Rios is pluricultural and has both agriculture and livestock sectors;
Villamontes is based purely on livestock, combining ranching and river
ﬁshing among the Guarani. . .. In Entre Rios we are like the black
sheep of the Department of Tarija: sitting between Tarija and the
Chaco, we don’t know where to seek support” (civic leader, Entre
Rios, August 2010).
As the gas economy grew and became more contentious in
the 2000s, it changed how these diﬀerent territorial projects
were articulated. Urban elites within the city of Tarija began
to argue that the region’s development should hinge around
natural gas extraction, and that this in turn meant building
a regional project by inserting the departmental economy into
global processes of energy production and distribution. They
argued that this insertion would generate ﬁscal resources that
would expand opportunities and could be used to build large-
scale infrastructure that would integrate Tarija not only with
the rest of Bolivia but also with neighboring countries (Chile
and Argentina: Humphreys Bebbington, 2010). This vision
has indeed been born out, and one of the primary mechanisms
through which this has occurred has been the construction of
roads ﬁnanced by gas revenues and linking the department
more eﬀectively to Santa Cruz, the highlands and Brazil.
“During my administration there were clear problems of roads con-
necting the Chaco to the rest of Tarija. People from the city of Tarija
and from the Chaco really don’t know each other because the
Chaquen˜os are more linked to Santa Cruz. Because of this we began
to propose building roads in order to more easily market the agricul-
tural produce of O’Connor, the ﬁsh of the Chaco, the grapes and wine
of other provinces . . .. To be able to use the [gas rents] we got permis-
sion from the central government . . .” (Former Prefect of Tarija 2004–
05, July 2010).
This was not, however, an entirely novel proposal, for agrar-
ian capitalists, wine-producers, and others had long been call-
ing for roads (Machicado, 2010). The diﬀerence was that gas
and hydrocarbon rents were now being appropriated as a
means of realizing these visions.
Elites from the Chaco have had similar visions, except at a
more local scale. They have sought to increase municipal gov-
ernments’ control over gas revenues, promote linkages
between municipal production and major urban markets,
and more generally use gas to increase the standing and cen-
trality of the Chaco:
“The Chaco was invisible in national debates, it was only after gas that
it began to attract attention . . .. We took advantage of the period of
disorder under the Sa´nchez de Lozada government to get laws passed
that were speciﬁcally for the Chaco and that ensured that the money
would not stay only in the city of Tarija. . . ours was a vision of regio-
nal autonomy, in which the Chaco would sit alongside the three big cit-
ies of La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz as an exporter to
Argentina and Brasil.” (Ex-mayor of Villamontes, September 2009).
“There’s going to be a dramatic change in [Villamontes] when the road
linking Bolivia and Paraguay is completed. Villamontes will grow and
become a great city.” (Farmer organization leader, Villamontes July
2009).For their part, since the 1980s and more consistently in the
1990s, indigenous groups’ have built a project based on the
demand for the recognition of their ancestral territorial rights
(Gustafson & Fabricant, 2011; Humphreys Bebbington, 2010).
“Since the 1980s they [Weenhayek leaders] have been charged with
securing recognition for the TCO [territory] . . .titling has been
achieved through contacts with representatives and senators in La
Paz. . . [and] pressure and the threat of roadblocks, now only four com-
munities remain to be titled” (Weenhayek leader, September 2009).
These indigenous territorial projects have also been molded
by the expansion of the gas industry. On the one hand, the
expansion is seen as a threat to their territory—and yet on
the other hand, indigenous groups have sometimes come to
believe that securing territorial rights in areas where gas ﬁelds
were found would enable them to negotiate ﬁnancial remuner-
ation or compensation from government and hydrocarbon
companies (see also Anthias & Radcliﬀe, 2013).
“In 2007, 2008, and 2009 the Prefecture signed commitments [for
development projects in the communities] but nothing materialized
. . .. you can write anything . . . but we Weenhayek know the power
of our vote . . .. NN [anonymized gas company] is in our territory
and that’s why we pressure them . . . now the leaders have motorbikes
and can get to meetings . . . Also NN2 [another company] gives money
for projects which the municipal government then matches” (Ween-
hayek leader, September 2009).
Control of, or access to, gas revenues is thus central to elite
and indigenous discourses alike, insofar as it provides the
ﬁnancial base with which to carry out their long-standing ter-
ritorial projects. However, even though coalitions each see gas
as a means to their ends, they pursue their diﬀerent territorial
projects in a tense and latently conﬂictive relation to each
other. One consequence of this tension has been to weaken
the possibility of crafting a Tarija-wide project for “gas and
development.” By the same token, national actors’ projects
have conﬂicted with these coalitions’ territorial visions. This
has been clear in the on-going struggle between Tarija (as well
as other lowland regions) and the MAS central government
regarding the election of departmental prefects and the distri-
bution of gas revenues between the treasury (i.e., the central
government located in La Paz) and subnational levels of gov-
ernment (Humphreys Bebbington & Bebbington, 2010). These
tensions also reﬂect deeply rooted prejudices and longer stand-
ing conﬂicts between the territorial projects of coalitions from
Bolivian lowland departments and those of the central govern-
ment and highland peoples (Perreault, 2013). The tensions
were made particularly clear in 2010 when a new politico-
administrative unit, the Gran Chaco, became an “autonomous
region” within Tarija, negotiating with the central government
that any ﬁscal transfers it received from gas would go directly
to the Gran Chaco, and no longer be controlled by the
Department of Tarija. This in turn weakened the departmental
government’s project for Tarija, which appeared to have been
a primary objective of the central government. 2 In this sense,
by building a link to central government, Gran Chaco
strengthened its own territorial project, weakened that of the
department and in turn strengthened the central state’s own
view that Tarija’s gas revenues should be governed under
the tutelage of central government in ways that would ulti-
mately consolidate its own, quite explicit, territorial project:
“When President Evo Morales assumed power, and began to rebuild
the presence of the State in the economy and broaden the base of social
rights . . . he also involved the Armed Forces in this expansion of the
state . . . If in addition we also consider their involvement in road build-
ing, the distribution of national rents (through Renta Dignidad, Bono
Juancito Pinto, Bono Juana Azurduy) and the control of border terri-
tories previously dominated by local caciques and local maﬁas, what
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through its own structures of coercive power” (Vice President of
Bolivia, Garcı´a Linera, 2010, pp. 409–410).
(c) Social coalitions and territorial projects in Tarija,
Villamontes and Entre Rı´os
(i) Elites and urban coalitions
There are clear and distinguishable elites based in the urban
settlements of Villamontes, Entre Rı´os and the city of Tarija,
even if these elites still retain important ties to the countryside
and invest in agriculture. In Tarija this group includes upper-
middle and high-income family networks who invest in agri-
business, construction, media, transport, health, education,
and legal services; it also includes the Court of Justice author-
ities, intellectuals, and the military. Some of these people are
members of right and center-right political parties and also
belong to Masonic Lodges and social clubs. Traditionally, this
group has controlled the departmental government (Prefectur-
a) and Tarija’s city council (regardless of the party in power).
Over the last decade and a half, they have used these positions
to build an argument for investing in gas-generated ﬁscal rev-
enue linked to a longer standing territorial project. This pro-
ject hinges around the creation of a bi-oceanic corridor
linking Tarija to Santa Cruz and on to Southern Brazil to
the east, and to the Paciﬁc coast to the west. This corridor—
which is also part of a far larger vision of regional integration
for South America (Cortez, 2012; Humphreys Bebbington,
2010; Pieck, 2013)—would facilitate exports of wine, singani
(a popular spirit made from grapes) and vegetables from areas
that have no gas potential. This project has been carried for-
ward through two main mechanisms: by investing resources
in road construction; and by using departmental government
revenues to make strategic investments in diversiﬁed agricul-
tural production networks between Entre Rios and the city
of Tarija and other western provinces which could then take
advantage of this new road infrastructure (see AUTAPO,
2009).
Traditional urban elites from Villamontes are comprised of
“extended families” that have, through access to public oﬃce,
been able to combine economic power with political power.
With urban growth occurring since the 1990s, these elite
groups—most with strong roots in local agriculture—are
increasingly engaged in commerce and the provision of ser-
vices. The younger generation of this elite is largely urban
and gains access to political power either through positions
in local government or other state agencies, while at the same
time keeping close ties with their families who continue to live
in rural areas and are engaged in cattle breeding. As indicated
by Cortez (2012), these rural connections inﬂuence the deci-
sions taken with regard to public investment and regional alli-
ances. Investments have again hinged around road-building
but also the construction of marketing infrastructure for agri-
cultural produce.
The urban elite of Entre Rı´os is both weaker and younger. It
has emerged much more recently, and remains closely linked
with the city of Tarija for reasons of proximity. This elite
moves back and forth between the two cities, and is employed
in public administration, commerce, and small-scale services.
Again, its political power derives from controlling the munici-
pal administration. Its territorial project is much less clearly
articulated and mostly hinges around improving accessibility
and ties between the city of Tarija and rural producers in
Entre Rios. This is a project that also sees the availability of
gas rents as a means of achieving this vision throughinvestment in road-building, as shown in interviewee quota-
tions above.
(ii) Rural actors and coalitions
Rural Villamontes and Entre Rı´os have historically been
occupied by ranchers, peasants, and indigenous peoples. Since
the exploitation of oil and gas, hydrocarbon operations also
make up part of the rural landscape. The Land Reform of
1953 3 structured the consolidation of these diﬀerent groups
of actors insofar as it created legislative and political means
for them to gain access to land. The reform resulted in a de
facto occupation by urban and migrant farm-working families
many of whom, on gaining access to land, steadily became
medium- and small-scale ranchers (livestock raising being
the deﬁning economic activity in the Chaco, especially Vill-
amontes). In addition, during the Land Reform process indig-
enous groups continued to be driven onto more remote, less
productive areas or ended up as workers (and in the worst
cases, forced labor) on ranches (Gustafson & Fabricant,
2011; Humphreys Bebbington, 2010). These production condi-
tions limited indigenous peoples’ options to ﬁshing, small-
scale agriculture, and above all the need to sell their labor to
ranchers (because their own lands were insuﬃcient to guaran-
tee social reproduction).
Leaders of ranchers’ and farmers’ organizations have been
closely linked to urban centers in both Villamontes and Entre
Rios. They have sought to participate directly in municipal
government and build alliances with political parties in regio-
nal and national government. Given the centrality of ranching
(and the lack of water for agriculture), the political clout of
Entre Rios’ farmers has been less than that of the organization
of Villamontes’ ranchers. Furthermore, ranchers in Villamon-
tes have formed alliances with all levels of local and depart-
mental governments while, in Entre Rios, eﬀorts have largely
focused on strengthening relations with the departmental gov-
ernment.
The 1952 land reform did somewhat less to consolidate the
land rights of a regional peasantry. This peasantry has been
dedicated primarily to crop cultivation and is composed of
members of the local population as well as migrants who are
from highland Tarija and the neighboring departments of
Potosı´ and Chuquisaca. As these families were not native to
the region, they beneﬁted less from the land-titling process
(Chumacero, 2012b). Furthermore, they have been far less
able to gain access to positions of political or bureaucratic
power in municipal and departmental government (municipal
elections began in the early 1980s). However, since the early
2000s departmental and municipal peasant federations have
gained greater political leverage by oﬀering clientelistic elec-
toral support to national political parties. Thus, for instance,
the peasant federation of Villamontes (a grassroots organiza-
tion that represents farmers but not ranchers) supports the
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), which has been in control
of central government since 2006, in order to secure farmer
representatives in the Legislative Assembly of Tarija and the
country’s Plurinational Assembly (the new title for Bolivia’s
Congress).
Indigenous Guarani, Weenhayek and Tapiete groups who
historically occupied much of the Chaco, have suﬀered signif-
icant reduction in their access to land and natural resources as
a result of dispossession and other processes (Kay & Urioste,
2007). However, they remain important actors within the rural
economy and develop multiple livelihoods strategies that com-
bine commercial ﬁshing, agriculture, production of simple
handicrafts, small-scale cattle husbandry, and migration. Since
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in a context in which international conventions such as the
ILO Convention 169 recognized indigenous peoples’ rights,
their levels of organization have strengthened (Gustafson &
Fabricant, 2011; Humphreys Bebbington, 2013) and their
presence has increased in regional and national politics. In
Tarija, indigenous organizations emerged in the late 1980s,
along with other lowland groups especially from within the
department of Santa Cruz. One of the ﬁrst was the Asamblea
de Pueblos Guaranı´es (Guaranı´ Assembly or APG), of which
the APG Itika Guasu in Entre Rios became a part. The orga-
nizational process of the Weenhayek in Villamontes began
somewhat later and in more geographically restricted areas
(Humphreys Bebbington, 2010, 2013), while the Tapiete (a
group of less than 100 in Bolivia) are poorly organized
(CERDET, 2006).
While diﬀerent segments of the rural population have there-
fore found organizational strategies and ways of engaging
national and departmental institutions that give greater visibil-
ity to their territorial projects, they have been chronically
unable to develop coalitional relationships among themselves.
This reﬂects three primary facts: ﬁrst, these three groups—
small scale ranchers, peasants, and indigenous peoples—all
compete for the same scarce land resources; second, long-
standing diﬀerences, grievances, and prejudices have existed
between highland peasants and lowland indigenous people
and complicate possibilities of coalition building; and third,
indigenous groups have long found it diﬃcult to collaborate
among themselves (as reﬂected in the diﬃculty that diﬀerent
Guarani captaincies have in agreeing on common platforms).
Indeed, rather than form coalitions these groups have at times
engaged in pitched battles over access to land as well as over
how indigenous people in Tarija will be represented and by
whom. As a result, no hints of articulated rural or subaltern
territorial projects have emerged in Tarija, leaving political
space open to projects conducted from urban centers and by
the national government.
(d) Social coalitions and institutional change after the gas war
In the early 2000s, the then center-right national govern-
ment, in alliance with traditional political sectors of Tarija
and large hydrocarbons companies, sought to expand the pro-
duction of natural gas for export to Mexico and the US via
Chile (Humphreys Bebbington, 2010). This resulted in a dis-
pute with other groups and other parts of the country that ulti-
mately triggered the so-called “gas war” in 2003, reﬂecting the
struggle for control over hydrocarbon rents as well as for the
sovereignty of Bolivia’s natural resources (Laserna, Gordillo,
& Komadina, 2011; Molina, Laserna, Miranda, & Zaratti,
2009; Perreault, 2006, 2013; PIEB, 2005). The conﬂict over
gas reﬂected the growing empowerment and organizational
capacity of popular sectors under the auspices of the emerging
Movement Towards Socialism (Garcı´a Linera, 2010), and a
struggle among diﬀerent coalitions in Bolivia to impose their
particular territorial projects, pitting a vision for an integrated
plurinational state against a model of sub-national autono-
mies led by regional elites (Hinojosa, Chumacero, Cortez,
Bebbington, & Bebbington-Humphrey, 2012; Perreault,
2013). Conﬂicts surrounding the distribution of hydrocarbon
revenues subsequently led to devolved powers and authorities
for sub-national governments and indigenous peoples, as well
as legal, ﬁscal, and constitutional reforms linked to revenue
redistribution, state ownership, and control of almost all nat-
ural resources other than land.While the “gas war” was national in its resonance, the fact
that the majority of Bolivia’s gas reserves were located in
Tarija meant that this was a national struggle over a subna-
tional space (three major gas ﬁelds in Tarija Sa´balo, San
Antonio, and Margarita produce some 70% of Bolivia’s natu-
ral gas, and the Department has nearly 85% of the country’s
known gas reserves: Fundacio´n Jubileo, 2013). It also meant
that the territorial projects of all actors and social coalitions
in Tarija necessarily became embroiled in national politics
and national policy disputes. The centrality of natural gas to
Bolivian development and political economy (Molina et al.,
2009) meant that there was no way for political actors in
Tarija to avoid having their projects and relationships aﬀected.
Their territorial projects had to be articulated with the gas
question—and as a result, these diﬀerent actors progressively
sought to make gas functional to these projects. They sought
to do so, however, in a context of acutely asymmetric power
relations—relations in which the central government and
hydrocarbon companies were far more powerful, and in which
relationships among actors within Tarija were also asymmet-
ric. Furthermore, actors pursued these projects in a national
context in which the election and re-election of a MAS govern-
ment meant that the political leverage of actors within Tarija
shifted substantially, with peasant and landless groups aligned
with the MAS gaining power, while urban conservative and
white elites lost leverage.
Three types of “gas eﬀect” on territorial projects are partic-
ularly important. First, the national strategy of “development
through gas” has meant that diﬀerent agencies of the national
government have become much more active and assertive
within Tarija in an attempt to create conditions that would
facilitate public and private hydrocarbon companies’ access
to gas. For instance, the national hydrocarbons company,
YPFB and the Ministry of Hydrocarbons and Energy appear
to “guide” the processes of prior consultation that they imple-
ment such that the results align with their mandate to grant
contracts for exploration (Bebbington & Bury, 2013;
Schilling-Vacaﬂor, 2012). The eﬀect is that local groups, espe-
cially indigenous populations under whose claimed territories
much of the gas is found, have become increasingly vulnerable
to decisions taken outside their territories and the region
(Chumacero, 2012b; Fundacio´n Tierra, 2009). Operations of
the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA), which reg-
ulates the allocation and control of land and territory, also
appear to facilitate the extraction of gas. Since the early
2000s and particularly under Evo Morales’ government, the
agrarian reform gave indigenous and peasant communities
title to more than 16 million hectares of common land, mostly
in the eastern and Amazonian lowlands. However, titling has
largely stalled for those territorial claims that are located in
areas with gas deposits, while private lands which overlapped
with proposed gas infrastructure and gas exploration/produc-
tion have been titled more quickly, leading to the often heard
complaint from indigenous leaders that the land titling process
has done more to secure the land rights of third parties within
their TCOs than secure the territorial integrity of indigenous
groups. The suspicion has been that the gas companies have
preferred to deal with private land owners and not indigenous
groups to negotiate surface rights. For instance, many individ-
ual farmers’ lands located along the Tarija-Entre Rios-
Villamontes road that runs parallel to a principal gas pipeline
were titled and then subsequently expropriated in order to
extend both the pipeline and the road. Notably, INRA’s work
in those areas was ﬁnanced by TRANSREDES, the company
in charge of the pipeline (Chumacero, 2012a) (see also Fig. 2).
Fig. 2. Land titling, indigenous territories, and pipelines in Entre Rios and Villamontes.
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recognize private land titles and, like TRANSREDES, paid
INRA to conduct the land titling process in within the TCO
Itika Guasu.
Second, and in the face of the presence of these national and
transnational actors, elite coalitions and indigenous and peas-
ant organizations alike have oscillated between confronta-
tional and clientelistic strategies as they pursue their
territorial projects and seek access to a portion of the revenues
generated by gas. The eﬀect has been to weaken these organi-
zations, as well as any possibility of coalitional relationships
among them. For instance, federations of indigenous peoples
that were created in order to pursue territorial agendas (such
as the CCGT, the Council of Guarani Captains in Tarija,
and ORCAWETA, the Organisation of Weenhayek Captains
of Tarija) have also become vehicles for engaging in client–
patron relationships with gas companies as well as with the
national government. This strategy of seeking gas-rents has
complicated relationships among indigenous organizations
and also reduces the development impact of gas rents.
“The Chaco has improved in terms of cement, but not in the quality of
life of rural people . . .. There is no support. The funds generated by
hydrocarbons . . .. don’t generate resources to allow an escape from
poverty . . .. Today there are consultation mechanisms, but they have
also become instruments of blackmail. . .” (M.F., Company representa-
tive, Santa Cruz, August 2010).
“Those who pressure hardest are the indigenous people, but they’ve
developed bad habits and live by ﬂeecing the oil companies, demand-
ing money instead of development projects.” (Ex-mayor of Villamon-
tes, September 2009).“Before [the gas boom] our livelihoods were based on the collection of
wild fruits and honey, hunting and ﬁshing until August. . . women used
to cultivate for feeding their families only. . . in August the elders used
to clean their plots to then crop maize and anco [a local vegetable]. . . in
the rainy season women used to collect carob tree fruits for chicha [a
traditional drink] or ﬂour to feed the household until the dry season. . .
Now, with the arrival of gas companies into the community, every-
thing [referring to the companies’ social corporate activity within the
community] has become a business”. (A.P.A., Leader of the Quebra-
chal Weenhayek community, July 2010).
A similar phenomenon is apparent among public institu-
tions. Thus, while most public authorities agree that gasextraction should be expanded, they disagree on how gas rev-
enues should be distributed within Tarija, and how the expen-
diture of these revenues should be controlled. For example, the
Gran Chaco province lobbied for an ad-hoc law (Supreme
Decree 138, 15/10/2009) to be recognized as an autonomous
region in order to receive gas revenues directly from central
government and so avoid any inﬂuence from departmental
authorities over the use of these revenues. In these disputes,
and reﬂecting the new constellation of national power embod-
ied in the MAS government, the principal losers within Tarija
have been the old political class and the traditional parties
(Seoane, 2005; Vacaﬂores & Liza´rraga, 2005). In their place,
a new regional political class has emerged, composed of farm-
ers’ unions, regional civic committees, local development com-
mittees, and the leadership of indigenous organizations.
However, relationships among these factions are complicated,
as they each ﬁght over the distribution of hydrocarbon reve-
nues in ways that complicate coordinated development plan-
ning (Chumacero 2012a; Cortez, 2012; Hinojosa, 2012):
“Although rural territorial dynamics here are a product of the absence
of planning, there are planning instruments . . . they just aren’t taken
into consideration . . .. those who make decisions don’t receive any
technical advice. For instance, Entre Rios has a land use plan but
doesn’t use it.” (NGO staﬀ member, Tarija).
To reiterate, this ultimately undermines the possibility that a
Tarija-wide coalition might emerge and articulate a shared set
of territorial projects for the department.
“In Villa Montes each group defends its own position, there’s no sense
of a collective role, there’s no interaction among them to elaborate a
project for the whole of Villa Montes. Seen from Tarija, it is as if
the only thing that unites them is the idea that “the centralism of the
city of Tarija is to blame” (Project Director, Departmental Govern-
ment of Tarija, August 2010).
The third eﬀect of gas has been through the revenues that it
has generated, which have been far greater than territorial
actors initially imagined. 4 During the initial promotion of
gas in Tarija, local actors already knew that they would receive
royalties because Bolivian legislation had stipulated since 1955
that hydrocarbon producing departments receive 11% of
royalties (this legislation came about in response to demands
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that gas royalties would be moderate and would be used to
help support their territorial projects based on an agrarian
capitalism grounded in export crops, wine, livestock, etc.
However, in the mid-2000s the boom in gas exports, the spike
in oil prices in the world market, and Tarija’s renegotiation of
its contracts with Brazil and Argentina giving it a much higher
price, all meant that these departmental revenues became
extremely large. This in turn attracted more attention from
the central government and other actors in and beyond the
region than Tarija’s elite had initially anticipated. On the
one hand this catalyzed conﬂicts between Tarija and the cen-
ter, and on the other hand meant that a wider range of “terri-
torial projects” saw royalty and tax revenues as the means to
their fulﬁllment. It also meant that these projects began to
imagine far larger types of infrastructure investment than
had initially been the case: larger roads, larger marketing cen-
ters, etc. Also, in both Villamontes and Entre Rı´os, the “gas
eﬀect” enabled the peasantry to negotiate their political sup-
port in exchange for gas-fueled attention to and recognition
of their demands. Indeed, in 2007, the departmental peasant
federation was able to negotiate with departmental authorities
an annual cash transfer of approximately US$285 per family
farm for the purchase of animals or farming implements (this
amount increased to US$570 in 2012). This arrangement,
known as PROSOL, was the only one of its kind in the coun-
try.
(e) Territorial dynamics after gas
While the expanded investment in gas extraction has inter-
acted with territorial projects and political alliances in com-
plex ways, its eﬀects on income, poverty, and distribution to
date have been more limited. This seems to be related to the
prior economic structure of the region. While economic dyna-
mism in the majority of Bolivia’s lowland and valley regions
can be explained by growth in medium- and large-scale com-
mercial agriculture, Tarija’s regional economy has been char-
acterized by greater diversity (see Table 2). Signiﬁcant sectors
of the economy have included: oil in the southern-central
region (Bermejo) up until the early 1990s; an increasingly
dynamic grape, wine and singani producing sector since the
early 1990s, concentrated in the valleys of the central and wes-
tern provinces; signiﬁcant trans-border commerce between
Tarija and Argentina; and, since the mid-2000s a more wide-
spread consolidation of small- and medium-size enterprises
across sectors (services, agriculture and cattle ranching, agri-
business, and retail), many of them triggered by public invest-
ments and expenditures ﬁnanced by the revenue (via tax
redistribution) and income (via employment) from theTable 2. Change in economic activity in Tarija
Ta
Sector 2001
Agriculture, forestry and ﬁshing 25.5
Other sectors 31.7
Commerce and automobile servicing 18.9
Building 8.3
Public administration 3.0
Transport and storage 6.0
Health and social assistance 2.0
Education 4.6
2001: Census of population and dwellings of Bolivia (INE, 2005); 2011: Natiohydrocarbons sector (see also Table 4 for the case of Villamon-
tes and Entre Rios). This diversiﬁed economic structure has
continued to be the main driver of patterns of income, pov-
erty, and distribution in the region.
The role of Tarija’s capital city and other smaller urban cen-
ters has been central to these local strategies in so far as they
became market places and centers of basic services for agricul-
ture and agribusiness activity (Beck, Paniagua, & Preston,
2001). As a result, the composition of departmental economic
activity has remained relatively similar, except for the signiﬁ-
cant increase of the public sector administration (by about
7% during 2001–11) (see Table 2). Overall, the impact of these
dynamics on social welfare has been positive: the percentage of
the population with unsatisﬁed basic needs declined from
70.3% in 2001 to 63.5% in 2011 (though this reduction is
slightly lower than the reduction of 8.6 points observed at
the national level). Poverty rates in Tarija fell from 61.6% to
41.3% in the same period, two percentage points more than
at the national level (Hinojosa, 2013, based on ﬁgures from
Bolivia’s Institute of Statistics).
The rural economic dynamics of Villamontes and Entre
Rios have not changed substantially since the exploitation of
gas expanded across their territories (see Table 3). In both
municipalities, the population occupied in services related to
the gas sector, such as construction, hotel and catering,
unskilled services and trade has increased (see Table 4) and
there has also been some internal migration from other regions
of the country to Villamontes. However, the principal multi-
plier eﬀects deriving from the gas industry (the provision of
high-tech services, the creation of sub-contractor companies,
etc.) have not been felt in Tarija but instead in the far larger
(and distant) city of Santa Cruz, the hub of the hydrocarbon
industry and the commercial capital of Bolivia, reﬂecting the
concentration of urban services, infrastructure, and human
capital there.
Natural gas’s most signiﬁcant impact on the economies of
Villamontes, Entre Rios, and the city of Tarija has derived
from transfer of gas-generated tax revenues to the region. This
revenue has been invested primarily in transport infrastruc-
ture, social infrastructure, urban development, rural electriﬁ-
cation, education, and health services in rural areas and,
most recently, water infrastructure (Chumacero, 2012a;
Hinojosa, 2012). This infrastructure has increased access to
basic services and there are also some early signs of asset accu-
mulation among indigenous groups (Cortez, 2012). However,
as noted earlier, while income poverty has declined in the same
period (Hinojosa, 2012), it has not declined any more rapidly
than at the national level; and while Tarija has among the
highest human development indices, these measures may be
distorted by natural gas production. To date, then, naturalduring 2001–11 (percentage of occupation)
rija Bolivia
2011 2001 2011
27.4 29.3 32.3
23.0 32.7 27.8
18.8 16.9 16.4
10.0 6.1 7.5
9.1 2.4 3.2
4.5 5.5 5.5
3.6 2.0 2.5
3.5 5.0 4.8
nal households survey (INE).
Table 3. Change of main economic occupation in Villamontes and Entre Rios (percentages)
Villamontes Entre Rios
2000 Around 2010 2000 Around 2010
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Agriculture and small scale livestock rising 33.3 22.2 27.8 24.4 50.0 26.2 50.0 35.7
Livestock rising (medium and large scale) 22.2 6.7 22.2 7.8 7.1 2.4 4.8 4.8
Fishing 13.3 6.7 14.4 8.9 0.0 0.0 7.1 2.4
Hydrocarbons-related activity 1.1 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 31.0 2.4 0.0
Other sectors 30.0 64.5 34.4 58.9 42.9 40.5 35.7 57.2
Based on 130 semi-structured interviews with representatives of local organizations (2010).
Table 4. Beneﬁts from hydrocarbons activity in Villamontes and Entre Rios
(percentage of responses)
Villamontes Entre Rios
Employment 7.0 16.0
Employment for men 14.4 11.2
Employment for women 7.5 8.8
Roads 11.4 14.4
Machinery and equipment 3.5 6.4
Health infrastructure 13.4 15.2
Education infrastructure 10.9 16.8
Training 7.5 0.8
Entrepeneurship initiatives 3.5 0.8
Increased commerce 4.5 5.6
New markets 3.5 1.6
None 11.9 2.4
No opinion 1.0 0.0
Based on 130 semi-structured interviews with representatives of local
organizations (2010).
114 WORLD DEVELOPMENTgas has mostly been associated with a sharp increase in invest-
ment in infrastructure and social programs, in ways that are
consonant with the demands of prior territorial projects and
also, in some cases, with corruption. There is not yet strong
evidence that this infrastructure has led to signiﬁcant improve-
ments in income-based poverty reduction and so, while Tarija
may not show strong evidence of a local resource curse, nor is
there evidence of any substantial gains from the gas boom.
This is particularly true in the perceptions of indigenous
people.
“The main occupation of men and women before the arrival of gas
companies was ﬁshing, though sometimes there is ﬁsh and others there
is not, selling it is also uncertain. . . Also, poor people had no jobs.
When there was not food we had to go somewhere else to look for tus-
ca [a local crop] for our breakfast. . . Women used to knit llicas [bags
made from a local cactus]. When the gas companies arrived to the com-
munity, their representatives only promised [support] but did not give
anything. We do not know what their projects for the community are.
We know that companies make a lot of money, but very little in the
community has changed. . . only a few people [referring to those com-
munity members who relate to a particular activity of the company]
have beneﬁted” (J.P.R. Leader of the Weenhayek community, Resis-
tencia, July 2010).
In addition, some interviews identiﬁed trends that suggest
elements of a nascent resource curse. Ranchers interviewed
in Villamontes were concerned that the sector’s productivity
has fallen, that their cattle stock has not grown signiﬁcantly,
and that they were suﬀering increased competition from
farmers in Santa Cruz and contraband beef entering from
Argentina. The possible implication is that the expansion of
the gas economy has been accompanied by an inhibition in
investment among ranchers, and the strengthening of the
Bolivian currency has fueled imports of Argentine meat.Farmers also grapple with increased employment costs
because of a dwindling labor supply as the available workforce
moves into higher-paying sectors such as construction. 5
“Since the companies came here, work in the countryside has changed
a lot. Before, people would come looking for work, but today you
can’t ﬁnd workers, they all go to work for the companies . . . The com-
panies improve one thing but undermine the development of other sec-
tors.” (Local leader, Entre Rios, August, 2010).
Perhaps the principal adverse consequence of national gov-
ernment intervention to promote the expansion of gas exploi-
tation in Tarija has been the increased conﬂict over gas rents.
This in turn has weakened social cohesion in the department
as well as in the two municipalities. This is not to invoke a
romanticized image of a past in which there was great social
cohesion—but it is to note that eﬀective territorial develop-
ment requires that distinct actors are able to negotiate, com-
promise, and collaborate. These capacities have been
weakened by conﬂicts over gas. Thus, while shifts in power
relations at the national level have led to the strengthening
of the Movimiento al Socialismo (the political party in govern-
ment since 2006), with important and positive consequences
for the country’s ability to beneﬁt from its gas revenues, the
high level of fractionalization at a sub-national level suggests
that a large part of these increased gas revenues has been
wasted. While this pattern would conﬁrm the argument that
a strong national government tends to be correlated with
hydrocarbon rents making a positive contribution (Bjorvatn
et al., 2012) in oil-rich countries, it also suggests that a strong
(national) government can co-exist with (or even lead to) seg-
mented coalitions at a sub-national level that reduce the extent
to which subnational territories are able to take advantage of
national gains.
A second adverse consequence has been environmental.
While at a departmental level, the aggregate eﬀects of gas
extraction on land cover and water availability seem thus far
limited (Hinojosa & Hennermann, 2012), localized impacts
have been signiﬁcant. There are serious concerns regarding
the potential future impact of expanded hydrocarbon extrac-
tion on the Serranı´a de Aguaragu¨e ecosystem (Humphreys
Bebbington, 2012). These diﬀerent impacts have aﬀected com-
munities’ water, soil, and forest resources. Additionally, the
construction of gas pipelines in the Pilcomayo River has frag-
mented the ﬁshing areas of the Weenhayek (CERDET, 2006).
There is environmental damage going back to earlier operations of
YPFB, though in reality it is not as dramatic as is claimed. The big
problem is that not much is known . . . Petrobras is careful when it re-
leases saline water into the River Pilcomayo because it doesn’t want to
lose its ISO certiﬁcation. Other companies store their water in the
subsoil and in those cases we don’t know the impacts. What is true
is that the operations do contaminate. By deﬁnition they contaminate,
above all in the exploration phase. Indigenous territories and colonists
have a right to be compensated by the companies. Currently though,
GAS AND DEVELOPMENT: RURAL TERRITORIAL DYNAMICS IN TARIJA, BOLIVIA 115companies pass the bill to the state (YPFB) and this makes no sense.”
(YPFB representative, Tarija, August, 2010).
Compensation for environmental damage and measures to
avoid it may need explicit public and private policies (Ospina,
Bebbington, Hollenstein, Nussbaum, & Ramı´rez, 2015).4. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have argued, through a case study of the
gas producing Chaco of Bolivia, that the expansion of extrac-
tive industry transforms territories in ways that are clearly
inﬂuenced by territorial projects of diﬀerent coalitions of
actors that precede the arrival of gas and the revenues that
it generates. In the case of Tarija, the gas economy has
strengthened territorial projects both of the central state as
well as of sub-national governmental bodies in ways that have
deliberately fragmented historical attempts to build a depart-
ment-wide regional project with its primary locus of power
residing in the city of Tarija. While the territorial projects of
Guarani, Weenhayek and Tapiete indigenous groups have also
been compromised by the rise of gas extraction, in the sense
that the consolidation of their claims to legal territory has
been truncated, these groups have nonetheless been able to
mobilize ﬁnancial resources for these projects in the form of
direct compensation payments from hydrocarbon companies.
The narratives accompanying each of these territorial pro-
jects have also been transformed by gas. Control of gas
resources, access to and use of revenues deriving from gas,
and arguments over how those revenues should be distributed
among diﬀerent government jurisdictions and diﬀerent social
actors have become themes in all these narratives. These nar-
ratives and the regional political economy have thus become
“hydrocarbonized” (Humphreys Bebbington, 2010). In a sim-
ilar sense, the national scale has become a constitutive part of
these narratives in that they each invoke, in diﬀerent and new
ways, ideas about how the national government should, with
resources deriving from gas, be supporting these sub-national
and local projects (see also Berdegue´ et al., 2015).
The combination of narratives and the social mobilization
underlying these territorial projects have contributed to pat-
terns of subnational institutional change that have changed
how resources are allocated and invested in the region. Elite
led projects that imagine a gas-based Tarija developing on
the basis of intensiﬁed integration into national and interna-
tional markets have led to large-scale investments in economic
infrastructure, in particular in roads but also market infra-
structure in Villamontes. Other elite led projects have led to
investments in more spectacular and wasteful forms ofinfrastructural consumption such as the palatial town halls
and marketplaces gracing municipalities such as Carapari.
Meanwhile the mobilization of peasant and small farmer
groups has induced quite diﬀerent forms of expenditure that
provide cash transfers to signiﬁcant parts of the rural popula-
tion. To some extent, this resembles the strategy used by local
coalitions elsewhere (c.f. Jaskoski, 2014, for the case of Peru)
which mobilize to take advantage of existing institutional
instruments to inﬂuence the ways in which, and where, extrac-
tive industries expand.
At one level each of these uses of revenues generated by gas
might be seen as rent-seeking. Indeed, the case study has made
clear that diﬀerent actors and coalitions have clearly sought to
capture or aﬀect the use of rents whether through occupying
political oﬃce, trading political support for social programs
or (in the case of central government) enteringpactswith speciﬁc
territorial actors with a view to weakening other actors. 6How-
ever, we have also sought to demonstrate that the reasons that
motivate diﬀerent actors and coalitions to capture rents and
use those rents in particular ways reﬂect visions of territory that
precede the gas boom. These territorial projects are therefore an
important causal factor in determining how gas has aﬀected the
development of Tarija. Furthermore, these projects have grown
out of the prior economic and cultural diversity of Tarija, the
implication being that prior socio-economic structures of terri-
tories inﬂuence subsequent territorial dynamics not only
through the productive and entrepreneurial capacities that they
bequeath but also through the political actors and territorial
visions to which they give rise.
We insisted at the outset that the purpose of this paperwas not
to determinewhether the resource curse had or had not been vis-
ited upon Tarija. We have presented data to suggest that Tarija
has performed relatively well on development indicators but
that this performance is not substantially diﬀerent from
Bolivia’s as a whole and also that it has much to do with the
relatively diversiﬁed agrarian economy that preceded the gas
boom. Thus, while the expansion of the hydrocarbon economy
in Tarija has been accompanied by economic and social pro-
gress, this progress can be related to both national and historical
trajectories of change and the ability of speciﬁc coalitions to
direct public investment toward their territories and particular
sectors, more than the exclusive results of sub-national expendi-
ture of gas rents. In that sense, the extent to which gas has con-
tributed to “successful” territorial dynamics in Tarija must be
viewed as disappointing, in particular given the high expecta-
tions that were held by the regional population at the onset of
the gas boom, as well as the oﬃcial discourse of central author-
ities regarding the many beneﬁts that a development strategy
based on extractive industries would deliver.NOTES1. In the mining sector (less so in oil or gas), extractive industry can also
be organized around small- and medium-scale producers. These are not,
however, the producers envisaged by Ministries of Economy and Finance
when they seek to support extractive industry as a national growth
strategy (Hilson & McQuilken, 2014).
2. See http://eju.tv/2009/10/regalas-para-el-gran-chaco/ for a debate on
the change of transfers of gas royalty from Tarija to El Chaco.
3. The Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria (NationalAgrarian
Reform Service) and the Land Distribution Scheme were reformulated
and ultimately became the INRA Law (No. 1715 of October 18, 1996).4. We are especially grateful to one of our reviewers for pushing us on
this point and making clear its importance.
5. That said, another factor in the increasing cost of labor is immensely
positive—namely the inability of traditional farmers to enforce historically
exploitative labor relationships of indigenous people (though this change
is due to longer histories of indigenous organizing and legal activism
rather than the gas economy).
6. We have not spent time documenting corruption, as another form of
rent capture, though clearly corruption has also occurred in Tarija.
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